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Universal coverage requires costcontainment. Working models 
of health care coverage from Hawaii, Oregon, and Singapore 
address different aspects of cost-containment. Hybridizing the 
three produces the following system: A percentage of an 
individual's salary is mandatorily set aside in an individual 
medical account. Using these savings, the individual purchases 
catastrophic medical insurance with a managed care organiza-
tion. Residual funds are used as a deductible or co-payment and 
to purchase additional medical services as desired. Enough 
funds should accumulate during an individual's working life to 
enable continued coverage after retirement. The basic health 
care package needs to be limited and is defined by a systematic 
and rational process based on cost-benefit analysis and demo-
cratic consensus regarding priorities and coverage. Medicaid 
recipients get the same basic package from managed care 
organizations as that available to the rest of the population; low 
wage earners receive sliding-scale subsidies from the govern-
ment. Co-payments and deductibles remain in place except for 
beneficial preventive services. 
The two burning issues facing American health ~are policy 
today are universal coverage and cost containment. To address 
the first without considering the second is idealistic at best and 
deluded at worst; to address the seconJ ~itt :~t addressing the 
first is unethical. 1 
Hawaii and Oregon, and the newly industrialized country of 
Singapore, have recently reformed their health care systems 
with these precepts in mind. Their novel approaches to the 
problem of coverage with cost containment have unique strengths 
potentially complementary, integrating these strengths to create 
an affordable, just, and politically feasible model of health care 
in the United States. 
Hawaii's QUEST2 
The burgeoning Medicaid bill in Hawaii ($64 million in emer-
gency funds in addition to annual funding of $492 million in 
1992, and even more required for 1994 and 1995) compelled the 
state to enact a strategy for indigent medical coverage-the 
Health QUEST Program. Managed care replaced fee-for-service. 
The various insurers in Hawaii, HMSA, Kaiser, Queen's, Straub, 
compete to provide a standard benefit package to these patients 
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for a prepaid set rate. Medicaid enrollees can have the provider 
of their choice from the participating plans. In the past, they saw 
any doctor they wanted so long as the physician accepted 
medicaid. 
Patients with incomes greater than 133% of the federal pov-
erty level pay a share of the premium as determined by a sliding 
scale based on income. The near poor and others previously 
excluded from government health insurance now have access to 
coverage. 
Under regular Medicaid, those enrollees who needed medical 
care had to be declared disabled and show they had exhausted all 
their assets before they became eligible for health insurance. 
QUEST does away with this disability criterion. Part -time work 
or job failure no longer threaten medical coverage. Under 
QUEST, this fear is no longer a disincentive for returning to 
work.3 
Health QUEST builds on the state's employer mandate. Under 
the Prepaid Health Care Act, employers have been required to 
cover employees working more than 20 hours a week with a 
standard, state-established package of health care benefits. This 
mandatory coverage has reduced uncompensated care and 
cost-shifting. Furthermore, it has facilitated voluntary commu-
nity rating by insurers with the young and healthy paying into the 
same pool. Consequently premiums are among the lowest in the 
nation and the general access to primary care has decreased 
high-cost service utilization.4 
The implementation of Health QUEST has not been without 
some administrative confusion. Patients who are used to the 
previous system have to adjust to seeing only their designated 
primary care provider. However, the concept is svund and these 
growing pains should disappear in time. 
Oregon's Plan5 
Oregon recently revamped Medicaid coverage for everybody 
below the poverty line by limiting the medical services provided 
or rationing. Oregon went through a painstaking and laborious 
open process to prioritize services. A list of condition/treatment 
pairs was generated using ICD-9 (International classification of 
diseases 9) and CPT -4 (Physicians' current procedural terminol-
ogy 4) codes. This list was then 'ordered' by computer using 
various criteria: The first condition was the ability of a treatment 
to prevent death. If any pairs were tied on this basis, they were 
then ordered on the average cost of treatment. This 
computer-ranked list was then reviewed by the Oregon Health 
Services Commission and further reordering was done by hand 
based on principles such as ranking preventive measures for a 
condition above treatments for the same condition. The opinions 
of Oregonians were polled at public meetings to finalize the 
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prioritization list. Comfort care, maternity and child health, 
family planning services, and communicable diseases were 
given a higher priority as a result. Cosmetic and infertility 
services, and treatment for self-limiting conditions, on the other 
hand, weren't. 
The cost of covering each service on the list was estimated by 
actuaries; the total cost at various cut-off points could be 
determined. The Oregon legislature then decided on the final 
cut-off line, in effect stating that services above the line were 
worthy of public funds, whereas services below it were not. A 
managed care capitated system with designated primary care 
providers acting as gate-keepers was installed to further control 
costs. 
For this past year, the cut-off mark was item 568 in a list of 688 
condition/treatment pairs. Excluded services included treat-
ments for self-limiting conditions such as the common cold 
(rank number 636), non-vaginal warts (rank number 653) and 
viral hepatitis (rank number 586). Conditions with effective 
home remedies, eg, noninfectious gastroenteritis (rank number 
590) and sprains (rank number 623) were also excluded, as were 
conditions for which treatment is ineffective or futile, eg, 
surgery for soft-tissue back injury (rank number 575) and 
treatment for cancer with distant metastasis where treatment 
offers less than 5% five-year survival chance (rank number 670). 
Cosmetic treatments, eg, nontoxic goiter (rank number 580), 
sebaceous cyst (rank number 688) and keloid scars (rank num-
ber 676) were also excluded. 
Singapore's Health Policy6 
The city state of Singapore's health policy has as one of its basic 
tenets the promotion of individual responsibility for health by 
avoiding over-reliance on medical insurance or state welfare. 
The incentive for staying healthy is financial. By mandate, 3% 
of an individual's salary and a matching contribution from the 
employer go into a medical savings account in the individual's 
name (Medisave account). This money is deposited with the 
state and earns interest. The individual makes withdrawals as 
needed for medical expenses. In theory, enough money accumu-
lates in an individual's medical account during the course of a 
working life to pay for medical bills or premiums post-retirement 
and during the final years of life. 
The government encourages individuals to purchase private or 
government catastrophic health insurance using funds from the 
medisave accounts. 
To ensure that middle and low income Singaporeans can 
afford their co-payments, the government subsidizes the cost of 
a basic package at certain hospitals. Within these hospitals, 
wards are divided into three classes: A class beds are not 
subsidized and provide creature comforts such as air -conditioning 
and private rooms. B and C class beds are subsidized and offer 
fewer creature comforts (much like the classes in a train or plane, 
same destination but varying frills). If a patient does not have the 
medisave money to obtain basic services in a C class ward, fees 
may be waived or paid for by a government safety net fund from 
general taxation. 
To moderate the excesses of the fee-for-service system, hos-
pitals have revenue caps, and limits are placed on the fees private 
practitioners can collect from a patient's medisave account-
though not from his or her personal savings. 
Two Themes in Cost Containment 
The seemingly varied considerations in cost containment cluster 
-
around two main themes: Financial incentives, and the absence 
of a natural limit on health care demand. 
Misdirected or absent financial incentives are a common 
thread running through issues like efficiency, supplier-induced 
demand, and individual responsibility. And medical demand, 
like greed, is potentially limitless. Technology and research lead 
to new and expensive treatments to prolong life, increase medi-
cal demand, and patient expectations. There is no obvious end 
point to either research or patient demands. 
Hawaii's QUEST program properly vests the financial incen-
tives in the provider, Singapore's efforts are remarkable for its 
emphasis on financial incentives to the consumer, and Oregon's 
plan recognizes the need for clearly spelled-out limits on medi-
cal services. All three approaches are worthy of inclusion in a 
health care policy. 
Financial Incentives 
The demise of communism is enough reminder of the role of 
financial incentive or the lack thereof in human endeavor. 
Health care is no different-notwithstanding professionalism 
and ethics. 
Hawaii's efficiency-inducing and waste-reducing incentive is 
directed at providers through capitated reimbursement for man-
aged care organizations. Capitated payment is an excellent 
incentive for providers to reduce waste, and to increase effi-
ciency .It motivates providers to reduce demand by emphasizing 
primary care, disease prevention, and realistic expectations 
from patients (unlike fee-for-service where the incentive to 
providers is to increase demand). Furthermore, by pooling 
Medicaid patients, the state creates a large block of patients for 
whom the various managed care organizations compete. 
Singapore, on the other hand, inspires the individual and the 
provider toward thrift. By using a system of individual medical 
accounts and high deductible catastrophic health insurance, the 
myth of the third party payer is shattered as one's own cold cash 
is on the line. The individual can go with a basic 
government-subsidized health care package and government 
health insurance, see a doctor only when necessary, pay the 
deductibles and save what is left of his or her medisave account. 
Or one can fork out for plusher hospital rooms, interactive 
television, and medical services excluded from the basic health 
care package but available as insurance options or direct 
out-of-pocket purchases. 
Limitless Demand 
The absence of a natural limit on health care demand in the face 
of finite health care dollars compels a government, managed 
care organization or insurance company to define basic health 
care coverage. Failure to clearly limit the contents of an offered 
health care package allows treatments in the gray zone of 
minimal benefit or even clearly beneficial but exorbitant and 
unaffordable treatments to push up the price of health care. This 
situation can escalate as new technologies and treatments be-
come available.7 
Recognizing that it had to choose between unlimited services 
for a few versus limited coverage for many, Oregon used social 
values and cost-effectiveness criteria to spell out clearly what 
was and wasn't covered. Such definition not only facilitates 
cost-containment but is explicit rationing rather than the hap-
hazard, implicit rationing that characterizes poorly defined 
health care packages. Implicit or hidden rationing can take a 
variety of forms including queuing, subtle social factors, and 
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administrative barriers to deter the delivery of services.8 By 
facilitating cost containment, predetermined and explicit ration-
ing minimizes the need for administrative pressures and hassles 
on doctors. Furthermore, the rationing decisions can be made by 
the people who are actually paying the costs and getting the 
benefits.9 
Oregon appears to have succeeded in defining its package 
without having to exclude beneficial but expensive treatments, 
eg, heart-lung transplant for primary pulmonary hypertension 
and bone marrow transplant for multiple myeloma and chronic 
leukemias are funded. Whether such beneficial but expensive 
treatments will continue as technology and new treatments 
burgeon is uncertain.7•10-11 
Defining a Basic Health Care Package 
A guiding principle for determining allocation in limited re-
source situations is the Utilitarian Ethic, "The Greatest Good for 
the Greatest Number." 12-13 Cost-benefit analysis is potentially a 
sophisticated and rational tool for this ethic to wield. 
Cost-benefit analysis quantitates what one often suspects, that 
the money being spent on a particular service might do more 
good spent elsewhere. One way of expressing cost -effectiveness 
is by using the QUALYs (quality-adjusted life years) approach 
pioneered by the British. QUAL Y s are calculated by an equation 
combining the number of additional years oflife (obtained from 
a given treatment) with the quality oflife in each of these years. 14 
Outcomes from across the spectrum of therapy can be quantified 
in this way. 16 Procedures can then be ranked formally by cost per 
unit of benefit gained. Unfortunately, cost-benefit analysis is 
fraught with technical pitfalls15-17 and has not reached the matu-
rity necessary to allow its unqualified use in ranking medical 
services. Oregon tried using cost-benefit analysis in its initial 
attempts to rank services but generated an inappropriate list. 18- 19 
Furthermore, the federal government said that the quality oflife 
weightages (as estimated by telephone poll of Oregonians) 
might be discriminatory against Americans with disabilities. 20 It 
would be a shame, however, to completely discard cost-benefit 
analysis. With refinement, such an approach should be far 
preferable to non-formalized techniques of comparing treat-
ments, 15 especially when seriously contemplating the exclusion 
of services. 
Some have suggested the establishment of centers for technol-
ogy assessment and outcomes research.21 -22 Such centers could 
guide, develop, and disseminate systematic knowledge about 
cost-effectiveness. With the data base on outcomes generated by 
such a center, the contents of a basic health care package can be 
rationally determined. Patient input can further improve the 
final product. 11 •23-24 To protect minorities and the disabled, 
antidiscriminatory laws should be enforced but without sledge-
hammering cost-benefit analysis altogether. 
A Healthier Hybrid 
Synthesizing the complementary features of the health plans of 
Hawaii, Oregon, and Singapore results in the following plan: 
1. Individual medical savings accounts are created by manda-
tory employer and individual contributions. 
2. Using these funds, the individual buys catastrophic insur-
ance with the managed care organization of choice. Residual 
funds are used for inpatient deductibles and outpatient 
co-payments, and to purchase additional medical services as 
desired. If the total monthly contributions undercut the insur-
-
ance premium, then a government subsidy makes up the 
difference. 
Generic Smith works part-time for a fastfood restaurant. 
Five percent (hypothetically) of his salary and matching 
contribution from his employer that goes into his individual 
medical account is insufficient for a high deductible medical 
insurance premium. A government subsidy makes up the 
difference and Generic is covered. 
Generic Smith undergoes vocational training and starts 
work for a car manufacturer at an annual salary of $24,000. 
Suppose 10% (shared equally by employer and employee) 
goes into his medical account. That's $2,400. He pays out 
$1,800 for his catastrophic insurance premiums and $50 as 
payments for two visits to the doctor. At the end of the year, 
he has $550 accumulated in his account. The bank awards his 
medical savings interest at the market rate. He changes his 
managed care organization once when shifting house. He 
attends his free health maintenance checks where both hyper-
tension and hypercholesterolemia are noted and treated. 
3. With careful budgeting, enough funds should accumulate 
during an individual's working life to enable continued cov-
erage after retirement. Any funds in excess of a certain limit 
can be withdrawn for nonmedical purposes. Funds remaining 
at death can be used in funeral expenses and inheritance. 
4. The basic health care package is defined with high resolu-
tion, service by service, using a systematic and rational pro-
cess involving cost-benefit analysis and democratic consen-
sus regarding priorities and coverage. 
Generic Smith retires at age 60 with $50,000 in his medical 
account. His account depletes by $2,000 annually in premium 
payments. At age 62, Generic is diagnosed with multiple 
myeloma. He receives out-patient chemotherapy and pays the 
$3,000 deductible when admitted with pneumonia. His prog-
nosis is poor and bone marrow transplant offers him the best 
chance of prolonged survival. This option is not included in 
the basic health care package, but Generic opts for it anyway. 
He pays the $100,000 bill with the remainder of his medical 
account funds and his personal savings. As his medical ac-
count was depleted after the transplant, the premiums and 
hospice deductible of his last years are paid for by the govern-
ment. 
5. To minimize reckless depletion of individual medical 
accounts, they can be used only to cover up to a part, eg, 80% 
of the charges for non-basic medical services. 
6. Beneficial preventive services are exempt from co-payments. 
7. The poor are assured the same basic package from managed 
care organizations, paid for with public funds. 
Regular Joe is an unemployed alcoholic. He has the same 
catastrophic insurance policy as Generic Smith, paid for by the 
government. He too has access to preventive services and a 
designated primary care doctor. Regular Joe is diagnosed with 
multiple myeloma when he presents with a pathological 
fracture. His prognosis is poor, and he cannot pay for a bone 
marrow transplant, but he receives chemotherapy as standard 
treatment. 
8. Additional refinements would include centers for technol-
ogy assessment, outcomes research, and practice guidelines. 
9. Changes in the malpractice laws and widespread use of 
living wills and durable powers of attorney also could prove 
effective in further controling costs. 
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The Ethics of the Proposal 
The ethical imperative of distributive justice (fair distribution of 
burdens and benefits) drives universal coverage. In our pro-
posed system, everyone has access to the same adequate basic 
health care package, the contents of which are worked out 
logically and democratically. Mandatory catastrophic coverage 
and community rating distributes risk, while the high deductible 
apportions burden to the individual according to usage. Also, 
those who want more will have to pay for it out of pocket; they 
increase their health benefit by increasing their personal finan-
cial burden. Such a system tries to balance equality, freedom, 
and responsibility: The equality is in distributing risk and 
providing access to all, the freedom and responsibility in allow-
ing those who want more to personally pay the difference. It is 
a two-tiered system which can favor the rich in terms of choice. 
However, if the basic health care package is carefully defined, 
the actual impact of any increased choice on disease outcomes 
should not be significant. Futile or ineffective treatment at 
additional cost will hardly make a difference in patient well-being. 
Employer mandates can result in a regressive mode of financ-
ing healtlh care. In regressive financing, payments are an in-
creasing percentage of income as income decreases. 25 
Jane Ordinary gets a $2,000 monthly wages and benefits 
package from her employer. As health insurance purchased 
by the employer is tax-deductible, the package includes a 
low-deductible health plan for $300 per month, or 15% of 
Jane's salary. Rob Normal works for the same company for 
a $3,000 monthly wages and benefits package; the same 
health coverage costs only 10% of his salary. 
In the system suggested, by taking medical account contribu-
tions as a percentage of income (and providing sliding-scale-
subsidies as needed), premium payments are proportional to 
income and therefore do not unfairly penalize the lower income 
classes. Proportional financing is ethically more desirable. 
One concern is that financial incentives for doctors to limit 
services will result in inappropriate withholding of testing and 
treatment. However, this should be less frequent with explicit 
rationing compared to the implicit rationing now so widely 
practiced. Committees can advise if financial incentives to 
doct0r~ to limit referrals are exceeding a dangerous level. 
MaHaged care quality assurance bodies can be supplemented by 
independent or state watchdog bodies, and appropriate exercise 
of malpractice laws and practice guidelines will serve as addi-
tional safeguards. 
The Politics of the Proposal 
Sixty7seven percent of Americans say their problem is cost, not 
coverage. 26 By defining a rational health care package in an open 
process, a balance can be struck between coverage and cost to 
suit the average American. Individual medical savings accounts 
can act as the political motivator for rationing health care by 
making even more apparent to the consumer (voter) the eco-
nomic realities of health care cost. The proposed system places 
everyone on the same side, the side of cost-containment.lt can 
abolish the sometimes adversarial relationship between insur-
ers, consumers and providers. 
The individual mandate (as opposed to single-payer systems) 
retains market place competition, an incentive to quality. It can 
replace Medicare in providing health care coverage during 
retirement, all the while maintaining individual choice and 
continuity of care. It reduces the risk of uncompensated 
deductibles with catastrophic insurance coverage. By exempt-
ing indicated preventive services from co-payments, patients 
will not be deterred from seeking such services. By using private 
health care plans and financial institutions, public bureaucracy 
and inefficiency can be minimized. 
Any objection to an individual mandate should be tempered by 
the realization that individuals are eventually paying for health 
care anyway-at the rate of $9,500 a year per household.26 The 
Hawaii experience has shown that mandatory coverage can 
reduce health care costs for all.4 
High-resolution definition of basic packages in a service-by-
service-manner will necessarily be a laborious process depend-
ing on majority rather than unanimous decisions. The inclusion 
of new treatments in the basic package could be delayed as the 
same democratic assessment must be applied to them as for 
services already included in the package. If these new services 
are to be additions rather than replacements, there should be 
consensus as to their cost-effectiveness. 
Conclusion 
For universal coverage to become a practical reality, we need the 
right mix of financial incentives to both patient and provider, 
and a well-defined basic health care package. The three working 
models of health care in Hawaii, Oregon, and Singapore provide 
many of these ingredients. Bringing together their strengths can 
optimize cost-containment and facilitate universal coverage 
with hybrid vigor. 
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